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DNDO: Congressional testimony from Ikle

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office dated April 19, 2005 by Fred Ikle to Congress, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack. Clearly frustrated with the current pace of progress, he argues for a national R&D effort in nuclear detection and forensics, but focuses on national labs and big projects while ignoring private industry. This focus on government could end up being misplaced. Worth a full read, but here are highlights,

• The seriousness of this cataclysmic possibility has become increasingly apparent. Hence, the need for a last-line of defense – the mission of DNDO. Defense experts have proposed better detection measures for some time. Already in 1997, the Defense Science Board spelled out the need for a serious R&D program to improve our technical detection capabilities. Unfortunately, there was no follow-up; and now, eight years later we are still unprepared. The establishment of DNDO is a statement of good intentions, but without vigorous follow-up, competent management, and – Mr. Chairman – strong Congressional support, I fear we will encounter more delays.
• DNDO is a unique organization with few parallels. I cannot think of another executive branch organization that seeks to pull together so many government departments and agencies in a cooperative effort for so complex a mission. Keep in mind that the cooperation required will be essentially voluntary. Short of an appeal to the President, the person who will head DNDO cannot order the other components to carry out their tasks. Such an endeavor has to overcome several hurdles. It can deteriorate into an endless series of interagency meetings. Differences about priorities might not be resolved. Budget requests might be delayed. The most competent people might become discouraged and move on to more promising jobs.
• Now let me turn to a major part of the DNDO structure which, for the long term, is
  the most important part: the R&D program for the ”transformational” development of
  sensors and other essential technology. Without better instruments to detect smuggled
  nuclear weapons, all the operational DNDO components will be unable to do their job.
  Without Better knowledge and techniques to identify the source of the smuggled nuclear
  weapon, the deterrent effect of our defenses will be greatly diminished. Indeed, these
  techniques of identification – called “forensics” – are crucial to avert a mistaken
  retaliatory strike that would get the United States into a war with a nation that did neither
  attack us, nor lend any support to the terrorists who attacked us.
  Better sensors and forensics are the heart of the matter.
• The management of “transformational” R&D effort must be inspired by the way we managed the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project. These successful programs were not run by endless interagency meetings in Washington that presided over budget constraints and bureaucratic deadlines for dozens of little contracts. Last summer, the Homeland Security Department’s research sponsorship on nuclear sensors was done through 135 contracts – one hundred and thirty five! (Some of these, to be sure, produced useful results.) The country needs a superbly qualified single manager for this work (as was the case for the Manhattan Project), a generous long term budget with flexibility, all to support an integrated team effort bringing together the professional strengths and the scientific assets of Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Oak Ridge, Argonne, and reaching out to specialists at universities and support for prototype production by industry. This Laboratory-centered program, of course, needs to be in continuing contact with the many potential users of the sensors. (The use of the forensic capacity must remain centralized for the US government.) The physicists at the laboratory will have to tailor their effort to the needs of the Coast Guard, border control, DOD’s Special Forces, the Navy’s work for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), special needs of the FBI and CIA, and so on.
• To sum it up, the Domestic Nuclear DETECTION Office is a great step forward in America’s struggle against nuclear terrorism. But without an “Apollo Project” on sensors, there won’t be much hope for detection and DNDO will become the Domestic Nuclear DISCUSSION Office. Forgive me, Mr. Chairman, for pressing this point so hard. Witnessing ten years of fumbled and failed effort have diminished my sense of patience, a little.

Fred C. Iklé is a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. He was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration.

-Sri

DNDO: Congressional testimony by Vayl Oxford, acting director

Vayl Oxford who is acting director of the newly constituted Domestic Nuclear Detection Office testified to Congress on June 21, 2005 describing its goals and agenda, “Detecting Nuclear Weapons and Radiological Materials: How Effective Is Available Technology?”. Specifically, he presented to the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology. This is such an important topic that it was heard three levels deep from Congress.

Based on this the DNDO is clearly focused on incremental improvements to the portal paradigm. Apparently they miss the critiques made in my paper titled "Nuclear Detection: Portals, fixed detectors, and NEST teams won’t work for shielded HEU on a national scale, so what next?". Vayl's testimony is worth a full read but I copied highlights below.

• "We will ultimately have the ability to fuse detection data and intelligence assessments in a near real-time environment to maintain an overall system and situational awareness."
• "Contrary to public perception that detection equipment is not sensitive enough, the actual primary limitation of today’s systems is one of discrimination. To overcome these limitations, the DNDO is currently investing substantial resources to the
  Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program, which is focused on developing detectors which
  will be able to discriminate between naturally occurring radioactive materials and true threat
  materials. So, rather than alarming when any radiation is detected, whether it is emitting from granite tiles or a nuclear weapon, these new systems will be able to determine, “yes, there is radiation present, but the radiation signature matches that of naturally occurring radioactive materials and not special nuclear materials or radiological threat materials, and, therefore, is not a threat.”"
• "The ASP program was initiated in direct response to a CBP requirement for more capable radiation portal monitors to be deployed at the borders. The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, or HSARPA, then issued two Broad Agency Announcements and awarded contracts to ten private industry participants for the development of these portals; these contracts have subsequently been transferred to the DNDO. These efforts will culminate late this summer with an extensive high-fidelity test and evaluation campaign to take place at the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (Rad/NucCTEC) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), where the developed systems will be evaluated against one another, as well as currently-deployed systems. Based on the results of these tests, a limited number of vendors will be selected to begin initial low-rate production of detection systems to be deployed at the border."

-Sri

NyTimes: DHS to rip out old detectors and put in new ones

U.S. to Spend Billions More to Alter Security Systems

The articles says,

• problems identified with radiation monitors deployed are prompting an upgrade of these systems.
• false positives and lack of discrimination are causing alarms to be ignored.
• Officials are saying these systems were deployed in a rush post-9/11, perhaps for deterrence, and whether they worked wasn't as high a priority.

NTI makes a movie about nuclear terrorism

http://lastbestchance.org/

Last Best Chance is a documentary-drama about how Al Qaeda terrorists make a nuclear weapon and create a surprise attack just like 9/11.

WashPost: Megaports initiative yields few foriegn ports equipped with nuclear detectors

Study: Few Nuke Detection Systems at Ports
Washington Post - Washington,DC,USA
... The department also has failed to develop long-term plans to expand the security measures beyond ports slated for the detection systems by 2010, the Government ...

US Called Unprepared For Nuclear Terrorism

US Called Unprepared For Nuclear Terrorism
Washington Post - Washington,DC,USA
... John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) gave the same answer: a nuclear device in the hands of terrorists. But more than 3 1/2 years after the Sept. ...

Detecting nukes in transit: What can the newly-established DNDO do?

Just finished writing a paper with Chari and Tom Tisch - it's titled 'Nuclear Detection: Portals, fixed detectors, and NEST teams won't work on a national scale, so what next?'. We analyze the *use* of nuclear detectors to help prevent terrorist nuclear attacks, and we conclude that fixed detector approaches (such as those currently being implemented) are unlikely to be that effective. Here's the executive summary of the paper:

Nuclear Detection: Portals, fixed detectors, and NEST teams won’t work on a national scale, so what next?

Recognizing the need for detecting terrorist attempts to transport or use radiological and fissile nuclear materials, President Bush’s FY 2006 budget request includes $246 million to form a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).[1] “The DNDO will provide a single accountable organization with dedicated responsibilities to develop the global nuclear detection architecture, and acquire, and support the deployment of the domestic detection system…”[2] How can DNDO planners deliver a global nuclear detection architecture that works?

Nuclear detection systems, as architected and deployed today, leave loopholes in the transportation network that terrorists can easily exploit by making use of light road vehicles to private jets to oil tankers.[3] Progress can be made if we face up to three fundamental facts:

1.      Terrorists are most likely to use highly enriched uranium (HEU), not plutonium: assembly of a HEU bomb does not involve technically complex detonation as with a plutonium bomb.

2.      Terrorists can circumvent a network of fixed detectors: fixed detectors not only lack sufficient proximity and exposure to the vehicle in transit but also do not screen many types of vehicles.

3.      R&D breakthroughs cannot change the physics of detection: passive detection of HEU will always be limited by its natural rate of radioactivity, and the attenuation of radioactivity is sharp with distance/shielding.[4] The gamma rays and neutrons useful for detecting shielded HEU permit detection only at short distances (2-4 feet or less) and require that there is sufficient time to count a sufficient number of particles (several minutes to hours).

Recommendation: Due to fundamental physical limits, the current trend toward a fixed detector infrastructure is a dead-end. The only way shielded HEU can be effectively detected is if commercially available detector technology, rather than being kept at fixed locations, is directly integrated into smaller vehicles and used in conjunction with portals or inspection schemes for larger vehicles. Detectors would travel with vehicles and have enough time to record radioactivity before reporting their readings to a network of check-points (in the same way E-Z pass collects highway tolls). Our paper, “Nuclear Detection: Portals, fixed detectors, and NEST teams won’t work on a national scale, so what next?” explores tradeoffs in detecting HEU in transit, and analyzes technical, operational, and economic feasibility.

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[1] “R&D in the Department of Homeland Security”, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/06pch12.htm

[2] “Fact Sheet: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4474

[3] Medalia, J., 2005, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses,” CRS Report for Congress, The Library of Congress
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/43399.pdf

[4] attenuation of radioactivity with distance is subject to an inverse-square law in free-space and is exponential with shielding

Experts skeptical about new domestic office of nuclear detection (DNDO)

Experts Question Detection Unit's Reach, High
All Hands Network - Columbia,MD,USA
... Although ambiguous and still evolving, official characterizations of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's mission have at times indicated a scope of ...

Ukraine to use US equipment to detect nuclear smuggling

Ukraine to Accept US Nuclear Smuggling Detection Equipment
Environment News Service - USA
... General Lytvyn, chairman of the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, signed an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at ...

147 puff detectors to be installed by January 2006, SFO 11th in line

New SFO detector sniffs out traces of explosives Passenger steps ...
San Francisco Chronicle - USA
A state-of-the art explosives detector was installed at one of San Francisco International Airport's passenger checkpoints Thursday, one of the first to go ...